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Joachim Derichs
Abstract
Gödel’s  argument  for  the  First  Incompleteness  Theorem  is,  structurally,  a  proof  by
contradiction.  This  paper  intends  to  reframe the  argument  by,  first,  isolating  an  additional
assumption  the  argument  relies  on,  and  then,  second,  arguing  that  the  contradiction  that
emerges  at  the  end  should  be  redirected  to  refute  this  initial  assumption  rather  than  the
completeness of number theory
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Section 1 – Introduction
It’s the signature move of Gödel’s argument to establish, based on the eponymous Gödel numbering,
an ingenious mapping into number theory. But a mapping always has two sides, a preimage and an
image, and we need to be as clear about the first as we are about the second. So what, exactly, is being
mapped into number theory ?
On one side the mapping is already wonderfully clear, as it lands in first-order number theory. On the
side of the preimage, much murkier. What we typically find there is a semi-formalism, assembled from
different elements that are not well integrated: usually some recursion theory, often some naïve string
set theory, always some highly uncommon notations to deal with encodings. All in all, a setup that
seems dangerously complicated, and confusing. 
This paper contends that we can do better, and wants to show it by restating the argument in a form that
is more formally rigorous, and much more transparent.
In essence, we want there to be, on the preimage side as well, a theory phrased in the language of the
predicate calculus. This will allow us to reconstruct the argument on a securely syntactic basis so that
every step is realised as either a derivation inside a theory or a mapping between theories.
Among all the systems of notation currently in service, predicate logic is by far the best understood and
most rigorously tested through long practical use. That we will be able to eliminate from the argument
all elements not compatible with its rules brings several advantages:
Maximum safety, as a standard in general use replaces niche formalisms like recursion theory 
and devices like corners or overlines that have no application outside metamathematics.
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Maximum rigour, as a fully formal theory replaces an ad hoc assemblage of various notations 
at the origin of mapping, and concerning the target any suggestions of mapping to “numbers” 
rather than a theory are driven away. 
Maximum transparency, as having the identical type of formalism on either side allows us to 
move from a complicated and idiosyncratic definition of the mapping to a much simpler one, 
in the form of a thoroughly normal and instantly readable homomorphism.
At the end of the process we may find that the current messily mixed, residually informal setup can be
recovered without loss inside predicate logic. In that case, the exercise, though laudable, would have
achieved little beyond routine hygiene. Streamlining the argument only to obtain the same result would
be of limited interest. On the other hand, if we discover that certain features are not recoverable under
what is, so to speak, the gold standard of formalisation, then that will tell decisively against those
features.
Once done clarifying, with a theory on both sides, we shall proceed to set up clean syntactic mappings
between them:
Definition 1.1: A modelling transformation is a function m from the strings of a theory T to
the strings of a theory M such that
1. m respects the roles of strings, mapping
terms of T to terms of M,
predicates of T to predicates (of the same arity) of M,
sentences of T to sentences of M.
2. m commutes with logical connectors, quantification, and substitution, i.e.
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for all sentences φ m(φ) =  m(φ)
for all sentences φ, ψ m(φ  ψ) = m(φ)  m(ψ)
for all predicates P, (x free) m(x P(x)) = x m(P(x))
for all predicates P, terms t m(sub(P,t)) = sub(m(P),m(t))
3. m preserves provability, if T |- φ then M |- m(φ)
With an ironic nod to the semantic usage, we will call a consistent and complete M that receives a T
under such a transformation a model for T.
The clarified preimage for Gödel’s mapping should not only be a theory, but a theory  of a peculiar
kind. It needs to be literal about the strings of number theory in this technically precise sense:
Definition 1.2: A theory M is said to be meta to a theory T if all strings belonging to T are
well-formed as primitive terms in M.
In  a  theory  meta  to  number  theory,  the  strings  of  number  theory  figure  as  closed  terms.  String
predicates – e.g. the predicate of being a well-formed sentence – must first exist, unencoded, in a string
theory before they can be projected, under a code, into number theory. The theory of number-theoretic
strings is where string predicates live, in number theory they are only guests.
Interpretation,  whether  formal  or  informal,  semantic  or  syntactic,  is  necessarily  a  binary  relation,
interpreting an A as a B, the image as the preimage. Before we can even think of interpreting arithmetic
relations as string relations, we must secure possession of the string relations first.
So before Gödel’s encoding argument can even begin,  we need the following: At the origin of the
mapping, a theory that is meta to number theory, and thus allows string predicates over the strings of
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number theory to be defined. The most important relation for the argument being provability, all the
other relations only serve to support it.
Let  AR stand  for  any first-order  successor-based  theory that  contains  Robinson’s  Q.  AR could be
number theory, or any suitably weaker subtheory.
What we need, then, for Gödel’s argument to take off – or at least to take off in a clean, purely syntactic
framework – is, minimally, this:
Definition 1.3: STRING is a first-order theory that is meta to  AR and contains a predicate
PROV(x) that directly defines provability for AR.
A distinct concept calls for distinct terminology. We say directly defines in order to emphasise again
that the strings of  the base theory appear in  STRING nakedly, untouched by any encoding. Strings
come just as they are. Literally literal.
For now, to maintain the symmetry between preimage and image, we shall limit the search for STRING
to first-order theories. We promise to circle back to this limitation before the end.
The plan for the remainder of the paper is as follows: 
(Section 2)  Examine STRING, the distilled preimage
(Section 3)  Examine concatenation, the crucial function in STRING
(Section 4)  Build modelling transformations between STRING and AR
(Section 5)  Recover a form of Gödel’s Theorem
(Section 6)  Deal with the consequences of the restated Theorem
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Section 2 – Building STRING
This section examines the anatomy of STRING, the theory that is meant to constitute the preimage.
For the avoidance of misunderstanding, STRING is not and does not pretend to be what is often called
‘the meta theory’.  STRING is something much simpler: a concatenation-based, fully formal theory
serving as the preimage for a mapping that the largely informal meta theory is used to describe. The
language of STRING is first-order logic; the language of the background ‘theory’ is more or less lightly
formalised English.
Definition 2.1: Let C be the first-order language (with identity) consisting of a single binary
function c(x,y), and for constants, strings over a given finite alphabet Σ.
Writing concatenation as a standard binary function is painfully inconvenient, which is why it is almost
never done. Most presentations introduce specialised notations or conventions that incorporate the meta
function of  concatenation  by  juxtaposition,  effectively  putting  “xy” in  place  of  c(x,y).  We will  be
avoiding these sleeker notations as a part of a principled commitment to staying within the notational
means of predicate logic. In circumstances like ours, lack of polish can be a virtue. Clunky is good
because it rattles whenever problematic moves are attempted.
For the following, note how among the predicate expressions from  C there is a subset representing
predicates that are primitive recursive in concatenation.
Proposition 2.2: For STRING to exist it is sufficient that for any finite number of primitive 
recursive string predicates Pi (i ≤ n)  a theory T in C exists that
(1) contains concatenation and string identity
(2) decides the predicates Pi, so that for all strings s over Σ,
T |- Pi(s) or T |- Pi(s)
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Condition (1) requires the meaning of predicate expressions to be anchored by the c-function. What
precisely is entailed by capturing concatenation will be the topic of the next section. For the duration of
this section we will follow the example of all the textbook arguments for Gödel’s Theorem and take
native  concatenation  for  granted.  We will  assume that  the  c-function  behaves  as  expected,  that  it
concatenates unencoded literals in just the way a naïve user would expect it to.
With  the  native  c-function  a  given,  the  remaining  content  of  the  proposition  covers  well-trodden
ground. We need only sketch a proof.
The intermediate step required is a predicate expression PROOF(x,y) that formalises the string relation
‘x is a proof sequence for the sentence y’. As first shown by Gödel himself, there exists a predicate
PROOF*(n,m) in number theory that, as far as concatenation extends, could serve as a homomorphic
image for PROOF. Moreover, PROOF*(n,m) would be primitive recursive, and readily decidable. So
we can simply argue that if PROOF is definable indirectly as an arithmetic relation, then it must be
even more easily definable directly, without the extra complication of an encoding.
It  is  common  knowledge  that  concepts  like  NUMERAL,  VARIABLE,  TERM,  PREDICATE,
SENTENCE  are  primitive  recursive  in  concatenation;  as  is  the  relation  of  being  an  immediate
consequence. Putting it all together, PROOF is quickly built.
So assuming only that the meaning of predicate expressions from C is anchored by concatenation,
PROV(x) := y PROOF(y,x) will directly define provability.
To be clear, definability as used in the proposition is not intended to be definability according to this
conventional definition:
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Definition 2.3: A predicate P from an arithmetic theory AR definestraditional a preformal string
property PROP, if for all s*, g an encoding function,
|= PROP is true for s  AR |- P(g(s))
First of all, we do not want to encode. Instead, as already practised above, STRING means to formalise
facts about naked literals. Hence our g is absent / the identical function. (To avoid confusion, we might
choose to change the formatting for strings from the base theory, to bold or in some other uniform way,
but that’s it. No character replacement, and certainly no numeric encoding.)
Second,  the  way in which the  conventional  definition includes  unexamined properties,  along with
“structures” that are semiformal at best, is profoundly unsatisfactory. It would be irresponsible to put
any trust into unformalised ideas about string properties unless and until they have been refined into the
predicates  of  an  actual  theory.  The  conventional  definition  has  it  backwards.  One  should  not  be
referring theories to informal notions as the standard from which to take directions. We want theories to
set the standard, and eliminate informal notions like PROP, as well as the accompanying truth talk.
Concatenation-based string theories represent much the clearest expression, the least slippery grip we
have on the concept of a string property. String properties are so obviously at home there that it would
in many ways be better to turn the definition talk around and say that the existence of a predicate in a
string theory is what makes a well-defined string predicate. The predicates of string theories would then
“define” by definition.
Before we had, for sentences φ of the arithmetic base theory,
|= φ is provable in AR  AR |- PROV*(g(φ))
Now PROV directly defines provability, so that
STRING |- PROV(φ)  AR |- φ
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Much  simpler,  no  more  g,  and  everything  underpinned  by  thoroughly  formal  definitions.  Since
assuming c works at all, it works as well for the negated predicate, we also get a second line:
STRING |- PROV(φ)  AR |/- φ
Later on, when ready to start mapping to AR, we will be redefining representation as:
STRING |- PROV(φ)  AR |- PROV*(g(φ))
So eventually, we will get AR |- PROV*(g(φ)) back, but will have eliminated all informal notions.
Definition 2.4: A first-order theory is said to be strictly axiomatisable if is it axiomatised by a
finite number of sentences or schemes such that any scheme can be summarised by a single
sentence in higher-order logic.
The single sentence from higher-order logic provides a pattern against which axioms can be checked.
Clearly, Peano arithmetic is strictly axiomatisable – its scheme is summarised in second-order logic.
For naturally occurring theories, including of course Q,  the definitions of ‘strictly axiomatisable’ and
‘recursively  axiomatisable’ are  coextensive.  The  adjusted  definition  is  intended  only  to  exclude
artificial axiomatisations by pure enumeration or infinite indexing, which recursive axiomatisability
might allow through.
Corollary 2.5: For any consistent strictly axiomatisable theory  T, if  STRINGT is complete,
then
STRINGT |- PROVT(φ)  T |- φ
Definition 2.6:  A theory that  contains  concatenation is  said to  directly  express any string
relation that it decides.
STRING, if it were complete, would directly expresses provability for AR.
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Section 3 – On concatenation
In the previous section we have shown that the existence of a meta string theory that directly defines
provability reduces to the existence of a theory that contains concatenation.
Speaking of concatenation, we have to be clear which form of concatenation we mean. There are two
related but essentially different forms of concatenation. Both have their origin in the naïve concept of
concatenation, but they do address different aspects.
The first form of concatenation is implicit. It  is well-known and well-understood. Concatenation is
formalised as an implicit binary function not unlike the Peano successor function. A typical sentence of
such a theory would be the axiom of associativity: c(x,c(y,z)) = c(c(x,y),z).  An example of a weak
theory  of  implicit  concatenation,  with  most  of  the  axioms  going  back  to  Tarski,  is  contained  in
Grzegorczyk [2005]. Stronger versions add an induction scheme, where the successor equivalent of a
string is the string extended by one letter. The strongest version is defined, just as it is for arithmetic, by
its second-order axiom of induction.
Implicit concatenation theories are characterised by the fact  that  they allow for only finitely many
constants, one for each letter of their alphabet. Let’s say that there are only two letters, a and b. The
string “ab” would then not be a term of the theory. Implicit concatenation theories are therefore unable
to make, let alone decide, statements of the form “c(a,b) = ab”. 
One could paraphrase this by saying that implicit concatenation theories express naïve concatenation
only up to typographical permutation. Implicit concatenation only captures structural properties that are
independent  of  an  instantiation  in  concrete  strings.  It  is  not  able  to  prove  or  refute  that  the
concatenation of two given concrete strings is a third concrete string.
The  second  form  of  concatenation  is  much  less  well  understood.  We  will  call  it  extensional
concatenation.  It  can  be  thought  of  as  implicit  concatenation  made  concrete,  or  fully  interpreted.
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People,  and  mathematicians  especially,  use  it  fluently,  and  daily;  but  very  rarely  do  they  stop  to
examine it.
Suppose we start again with only two letters, and want a language that will prove all and only the ‘true’
atomic concatenation statements (as naïvely understood) about these letters. For letters a and b that
would mean that the language should prove e.g. c(a,b) = ab and c(a,ab) = aab, and disprove c(a,a) = a.
It should have become clear by now that extensional concatenation is a different and distinct concept
from  what  is  captured  in  theories  of  implicit  concatenation.  Extensional  concatenation  fixes  the
meaning of strings that implicit concatenation leaves to vary.
The  point  we  have  been  building  up  to  is  that  Gödel-style  meta  arguments  absolutely  require
extensional concatenation. When the argument turns on a concrete string encoding another concrete
string, representation up to typographical permutation is obviously not good enough.
Hence this first rough statement of an assumption:
Gödel’s Assumption (rough) [3.1]: Extensional concatenation is a well-defined function; and
as such, primitive recursive.
The standard argument assumes primitive recursiveness for plenty of string relations. PROOF and all
the other relations involved in its construction can only be primitive recursive if native concatenation,
which lies at the base of their definition, is well-defined and primitive recursive, too.
There is no way of avoiding the use of extensional concatenation in Gödel-style arguments, as there is
no way of talking about the strings of an underlying theory without it. Given the use, we would want to
know  that  the  naïve  concept  of  extensional  concatenation  can  be  trusted.  The  prime  means  of
demonstrating a clear understanding, and inspire trust, would be to present a consistent formalisation.
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Now we want to avoid talk of recursion because recursive formalisations for native string properties are
almost inevitably circular, assuming concatenation by juxtaposition as part of the definition.1
Due to reservations about recursion theory, and more important, to fit underneath STRING, we expect
extensional concatenation to be formalisable in predicate logic instead:
Gödel’s  Assumption  (still  rough)  [3.2]: Extensional  concatenation  is  formalisable.
In other words, there exists a theory  CONCAT containing a binary function c that correctly
expresses extensional concatenation for atomic sentences over a finite alphabet , so that for
all s,t,u  *,
CONCAT |- c(s,t) = u iff u is the concatenation of s and t
As a ubiquitous meta function, it is extremely easy for informal uses of extensional concatenation to
intrude into an argument. The best protection against such intrusions is what we are already planning to
do: Restate the preimage as a theory, and the entire interpretation process as a mapping from theory to
theory. Reconstruct the argument on a purely syntactic basis, as an interpretation free of semantics. To
that end, we will now try to formalise extensional concatenation. This will feel awkward as it is not
something  the  predicate  calculus  is  designed  to  do.  The  very  awkwardness  will  show  that  the
protections are working.
Gödel’s Assumption, as stated, is infuriatingly vague. ‘Correctly expresses’ is just a pretentious way of
saying  ‘behaves  as  one  would  naïvely  expect  concatenation  to  behave’.  The  phrase  ‘is  the
concatenation of’ assumes command of the very thing we want do more about than just assume.  But
the task we face is tricky: How does one articulate the inarticulate ? How do we even know that there is
something there to be expressed ?
1 In recursion theory and related formalisms, definitions of native concatenation typically look like this: c(x,y) = “f(xy)”, where f
relies  on concatenation  by juxtaposition  (Note  the  absence  of  a  comma of  the  right-hand  side).  Rather  than being  openly
declared, concatenation forms part of the formalism’s structure, which renders its presence silent and near invisible.
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In order to get a firmer grip let’s try
Definition  3.3: CONCATn is  a  consistent,  complete  and  strictly  axiomatisable  first-order
theory that directly defines concatenation for strings up to length n over a finite alphabet Σ.
Writing out examples of CONCATn is straightforward if tedious. To illustrate, we present CONCAT2, a
theory consisting of six constants, a single predicate letter C, and the following axioms:
(As the assumption that concatenation should be a total function has become problematic, we switch to
predicate-style notation to accommodate partial functions.)
Write U1(x) := x = 0  x = ’
U2(x) := U1(x)  x = 00  x = 0’  x = ’0  x = ’’
(A1) x U2(x) There  is  an  explicit,  pre-declared  finite  domain.
This  in  itself  is  nothing  unusual,  similar
limitations  are  implicit  in  the  workings  of  any
real-world computer.
(A2) x,y (U1(x)  U1(y))  z C(x,y,z) Concatenation  in  CONCATn is  only  a  partial
function, not defined beyond a given upper limit
(again analogous to real-world computing).
(A3)  C(0,’,0’) Within the strictures of the predicate calculus it is
(A4)  C(0,0,00) surprisingly difficult to give correct extensional
(A5)  C(’,0,’0) values in any other way than by listing all
(A6)  C(’,’,’’) instances individually.
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(A7)  (0 = ’) Necessary  to  prevent  trivialising  models  where
letters  are  equated  to  each  other.  Collapsed
concatenation  with  all  letter  set  to  be  equal  is
(nearly) successor.
The theory CONCAT2 is evidently decidable. The first axiom, by limiting the domain to a finite number
of explicit strings, ensures that quantifiers can be eliminated in favour of atomic statements, in a finite
number of steps. Axioms (A2) – (A6) together make sure that the list of atomic statements in C to be
checked against is exhaustive, and in turn quickly decided. Atomic statements in = are resolvable into
finite  combinations  of  atomic  statements  in  C  and  equalities  over  letters  only. Last,  atomic
(in)equalities over letters are decided with the help of (A7).
It seems reasonable to grant the intelligibility of the idea of constructing theories CONCATn on roughly
this pattern even for n larger than the physical capacity of any human or computer. As categorical
theories that directly define, the CONCATn perfectly embody the concept they present. In their albeit
limited realms, they are concatenation.
There  is  only  one  final  complication:  the  self-reflexivity  of  extensional  concatenation.  Due  to  its
circular nature, the construction of CONCAT2 we gave does not, strictly speaking, prove the existence
of  languages  CONCATn:  The  ability  to  construct  CONCATn presupposes  string  handling  abilities
tantamount to CONCATm,  for some m > n. It therefore seems preferable to phrase the conclusion that
these theories exist not as a proposition, but a postulate.  Moreover, to avoid the implication that an
infinite index i: n → CONCATn exists, we are going to phrase the postulate as a scheme with parameter
M: 
Postulate Scheme [3.4]: For n < M, CONCATn exists.
Let M be a massively large finite number. For n < M, we concede that CONCATn exists. The point of
M is not make a specific number the limit, but to make it clear that there always is a limit. Every
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introduction of CONCATn into a derivation comes with a side constraint that n < M. Let’s call M the
perimeter of concatenation. Inside the perimeter, everything works as (naïvely) expected. Most of the
time, work goes on normally, and the perimeter can be ignored. Only when a contradiction arises is the
perimeter constraint activated to absorb it. Sometimes, the argument can be repaired by shifting to a
larger  perimeter,  M+X.  So  for  example,  a  bounded  diagonal  argument  that  produces  an  element
provably unlike any inside the perimeter can be repaired by shifting to a larger perimeter that includes
the new element. At other times, the argument cannot be repaired. Diagonal arguments based on an
infinite index cannot be restated to be compatible with a perimeter constraint. Such arguments can only
be made by appealing to a more powerful postulate.
With the theories CONCATn in mind we are now able to clarify
Definition [3.5]:  A first-order theory, styled  CONCAT, is said to contain concatenation if it
contains a function c that satisfies the following definition scheme with parameter M:
For n < M, for all strings s, t, u in Σn
CONCAT |- c(s,t) = u iff CONCATn |- C(s,t,u)
We  keep  c  as  a  function  on  the  left-hand  side  in  order  to  ensure  continued  compatibility,  and
interchangeability of predicates, with theories of implicit concatenation.
Gödel’s Assumption (clarified) [3.6]: CONCAT exists.
What began as something slippery and semantic  –  a claim about the legitimacy of using extensional
concatenation in meta arguments – has now been turned into something purely syntactic, and thereby,
unambiguous.  Deciding  atomic  statements the  same  way  as  the  theories  CONCATn is  a  pretty
minimalist definition of what extensional concatenation should mean. Whatever one takes extensional
concatenation to mean, however one tries to pin it down to a precise meaning, it is hard to see how any
proposed formalisation of concatenation could be considered successful without meeting at least this
lenient condition. As a formal statement of Gödel’s Assumption it seems more than fair.
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What is to stop us from disposing of Gödel’s Assumption by simply proving it, delivering a theory that
contains concatenation ? Can it really be so difficult to define and axiomatise extensional concatenation
? Well, it’s not so simple, it turns out.
Concatenation is an unusual function. To appreciate just how unusual, observe that the candidate that
first comes to mind when one thinks about compacting the lists of explicit extensional values into a
single axiom – “x,y c(x,y) = xy” – is certainly not well-formed as a first-order formula, or indeed in
any conventional logic. Given how it allows quantification to reach inside terms, inside the “xy”, in a
way that mashes meta and object level, it would not be surprising if the leading candidate for Axiom of
Concatenation,  once  plausibly  fleshed  out  into  a  non-standard  theory,  would  turn  out  to  be
inconsistent.2 Is this the notion that the average logician unconsciously applies in appealing to their
intuition of concatenation ?
Without the trick of quantifying inside terms, CONCAT is in some trouble. The second idea that comes
to mind – interpreting xy as an (implicit) functional x*y, or even more explicitly as a function, c*(x,y) –
also fails. It leads to an immediate regress in the definition: x,y c(x,y) = c*(x,y) is not helpful. Thanks
to the stubborn rigour of the predicate calculus, the informal function of concatenation by juxtaposition
that we must inevitably make use of to operate any theory is not so easily hijacked for undercover work
on the inside of an axiom.
So it seems that in order to meet the demands of expressing the concept of extensional concatenation,
CONCAT would have to fall back on the unloved, third-best idea of listing explicit values – which is
not without complications, either. Without the trick, or an implicit functional, what stands on one side
of the equation defining concatenation must be a primitive term: the 0’ in c(0,’) = 0’ must be primitive.
(This is perhaps even easier to see in predicate-style notation, C(0,’,0’). When functionals have been
eliminated altogether, there is no doubt that 0’ can only be a primitive term.) While manageable over
2 More than a suspicion. Inconsistency for a non-standard formalism built  to contain the  Axiom of Concatenation is indeed
provable. Unpublished paper.
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finite domains, and perfectly workable for the definition of the theories  CONCATn,  when CONCAT
tries to gather all the finite theories together, it has to start dealing with infinitely many primitive terms
simultaneously. All of them must be handled, and fixed in their meanings by syntactic means only.
Formally,  0’ is  a constant,  a primitive term not analysable by its  own language. A single symbol,
without interior divisions. At the same time, the definition of constants as strings over Σ presupposes a
shadow theory that analyses them as non-primitive functional terms in concatenation. But we cannot
forever rely on outsourcing work to the shadow theory, formalisation is not complete without knowing
that we retain the capacity to internalise the work done by any actively involved third parties. The
challenge for  CONCAT,  in  a  way,  is  to  try  and  catch  its  own shadow.  Put  less  poetically,  in  the
mundane terms of computing: 0’, as a single, undivided symbol, must have its own entry on the code
table. This is a problem, as for all real-world computers the code table is finite.
Is  the  following  operation  computable  ?  Challenged  by  three  objects,  decide  whether  one  is  the
concatenation of the other two. The hard part is formatting the problem, recognising the objects as
strings. The inputs have to be parsed, someone or something has to break through the opacity of strings
presented as a single symbol, and delineate letters. The rest, once parsing is complete, is stupendously
easy.
At first, it may be difficult to see what the problem is. The hard part may not seem hard at all. Parsing
is  something  that  everyone  who  has  learned  to  read  an  alphabetic  language  does  involuntarily,
unprompted. One hardly notices the effort, and finds it much more difficult to stop with the parsing
than to parse. But stop is what we must do in order to be able to examine the operation, and really
understand what is involved in extensional concatenation.
Once letters have been delineated, answering the challenge is as simple as deciding sentences inside
CONCATn. Yet parsing is not equivalent to deciding sentences in CONCATn, it is equivalent to setting
up the CONCATn.
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Deciding sentences inside  CONCATn is trivial. Setting up any one theory  CONCATn is still  almost
trivial. A general mechanism for setting up all the  CONCATn is no longer trivial. It would, in fact,
require infinitary powers.
The crux is to get from this
| 0 | ’ | (on two consecutive squares)
to this
| 0’ | (on one square)
and vice versa.
Evidently, a machine able to effect concatenation and its inverse for all strings over a finite Σ would
have  to  be  able  to  accept  and  process  infinitely  many  distinct  string  objects.  Translated  into  the
language of Turing machines,  CONCAT presupposes the ability of accepting infinitely many distinct
symbols on a single square of tape. According to the standard definition of computability CONCAT is
thereby disqualified as a computable function.
A theorem that takes in an uncomputable function, ready-made, is not going to have any difficulty
proving uncomputability: Showing that functions derived from CONCAT are uncomputable, while true,
fails to show anything about the computability of unrelated functions.
Though a blow, this is not a knockout yet because under an alternative definition of computability
broader than Turing’s,  CONCAT might still be found to be a viable function. The decision whether
CONCAT could exist  as  a  non-standard function, provably diagonal to axiomatisations in standard
predicate logic, is something we will have to return to.
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Section 4 – Mappings between STRING and AR
We are now able to put together  STRING, the preimage:  CONCAT is defined, and we already know
that all string relations necessary for PROV are definable once CONCAT is given. Assuming only that
CONCAT exists, then so does STRING.
For most intents and purposes,  CONCAT already is  STRING.  The only bit  missing is a  means of
deciding primitive recursive predicates.
There  are  various  ways  of  axiomatising  recursion  in  predicate  logic,  characterised  by  a  trade-off
between parsimony and elegance.
One can choose parsimony, by sticking closely to the concept of primitive recursion, with axioms that
reproduce the mechanics of recursion theory in predicate logic. While certainly possible, this leads to
cramped and unwieldy definitions.3
Or one could opt for elegance, the transparency of intuitive definitions, but would then have to use
axioms that are evidently stronger than direct equivalents of primitive recursion.4
3Axiomatisation the parsimonious way proceeds by introducing < as an additional relation. The ordering relation needs to mesh
with concatenation so that it contains the partial ordering by string inclusion, i.e. c(x,y) = z  ( x < z  y < z ), with axioms just
strong enough to prove the finite definability of x < s, i.e. 
For any string s over Σ,
STRING |- x < s  ( x  = s1  x = s2    …   x = sm )
where the si are all strings over Σ shorter than s
From finite definability it is then possible to derive equivalences of the form:
P(x)  A(x)  ( xi<x B(x,xi)   P(x1)   …  P(xn) )
where A(x) is unary, and B(x,xi) is n+1-ary; both limited to bounded quantification
These provable equivalences are immediately recognisable as reproducing primitive recursion in the context of predicate logic.
4 By taking what induction has to offer one can enjoy the benefits of more fluent definitions for the building blocks of PROV:
   (N1) NUMERAL(0) (“0 is a Numeral”)
   (N2) x ( NUMERAL(x)  NUMERAL(c(x,’)) ) (“If x is a Numeral, then x’ is a Numeral”)
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Struggling for parsimony, however, goes unrewarded: All axiomatisations, no matter their degree of
strength, incur the same debt by presupposing the existence of CONCAT.
For the progress of this paper the details of the axiomatisation by which STRING is given are therefore
immaterial. The only fact that needs to be remembered is that the extension required to turn CONCAT
into STRING is strictly axiomatisable.
Having established the preimage, and knowing the image to be a first-order arithmetic theory, we can
move on to mappings between them. All the assumptions are in place for us to be able to connect
STRING with AR by way of two lemmas.
Embedding Lemma for String Theories [4.1]: For any strictly axiomatisable theory T, if T
is consistent, and STRINGT is consistent and complete, then STRINGT contains a model of T.
Proof:  Let  predicates  P(x)  map  to  PROV(sub(P,x)),  and  terms  identically.  We  show  by
induction  on  the  composition  of  formulas  that  the  mapping  describes  a  modelling
transformation. The only difficult case is T |- φ  STRINGT |- PROV(φ).
Assume T |- φ. By consistency of T, T |/- φ.
From completeness of STRING, PROV directly expresses, so STRING |- 
PROV(φ).
The axiomatisability of T is required for the definability of PROV in STRINGT.
Gödel’s  Lemma [4.2]:  If  AR is  consistent,  complete and strictly  axiomatisable,  STRING
consistent, then AR contains a model of STRING.
   (N3) ( P(0)  ( x NUMERAL(x)  ( P(x)  P(c(x,’)) ) ) )  ( x NUMERAL(x)  P(x) ) (“Nothing else is a Numeral”)
A similar trio of clauses – consisting of a base clause, a construction clause, and an inductive closure clause – can axiomatise any
recursively constructible string predicate. The clauses can either be introduced individually for each predicate, or more likely,
derived from a general induction scheme.
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Proof:  Technically  speaking,  what  needs  to  be  shown  is  that  when  concatenation-based
relations from  STRING are associated with the right successor-based relations from  AR by
way of a Gödel numbering, then the resulting mapping is a modelling transformation.
This is a restatement of Gödel’s groundwork for the First Incompleteness Theorem, accepting
the substance with only minor changes: Instead of trying to map, on the preimage side, from
informal  properties  or  recursive  theory  or  sets  of  strings,  we  are  now mapping  from the
predicate  strings  of  STRING. Instead  of  a  largely  unformalised  meta-relation  termed
‘representation’ we now have  m(·),  a provability-preserving homomorphism between first-
order theories.
For all relations R of STRING it has to be shown that if STRING proves a sentence φ in R,
then AR proves m(φ). Among the relations, we are really interested only in the first and last,
c and PROV, but to reach the latter, all the relations in between have to be retraced.
First to be mapped is concatenation. As far as the c-function stretches, it can be shown that the
targets envisaged in the standard argument are able to represent it.
Assume for simplicity that the target of c is a function, m(c) = c*. To even stake out the claim
of interpretation for c*, we would need:
CONCAT |- c(s,t) = u  AR |- c*(m(s),m(t)) = m(u)
while without the Assumption we have only:
For n < M, for all strings s, t, u in Σn
CONCATn |- c(s,t) = u  AR |- c*(m(s),m(t)) = m(u)
Now it is true that far as finite claims of interpretation can be stated they can then also be
shown to obtain. However, mapping atomic claims one by one is still not very promising, so
on top of existing, we would want CONCAT to be axiomatisable. In order to get further than
finitely far we would like axioms for c, so that we could then prove their translates in  AR.
Alas, we have none.
Failing axiomatisation, the other option is (second-order) meta-induction. For every letter a in
Σ,  right-concatenation  c1  =  c(x,a)  and  left-concatenation  c2 =  c(a,x)  have  to  be shown to
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preserve provability under m, STRING |- ci(s) = u  AR |- ci*(m(s)) = m(u). Induction on the
length of s and u would succeed, but does – obviously – require the assumption of CONCAT.
So there is hole in the lemma, and it is filled with assumptions about CONCAT.
Next, all primitive recursive string relations required for PROOF, as far as the c-function will
carry them, are shown to be homomorphic to their targets among arithmetic relations. With
completeness, the homomorphism would extend to general relations like PROV.
As before, the axiomatisability of AR is required for the definability of PROV in STRING.
Let f and g be modelling transformations. Let g map STRING into AR, let f map AR into STRING, and
for sentences φ put φ** = f(g(φ)). (Choice of letters is not accidental: Gödel’s numbering g can be
recovered as a mapping between terms induced by our g.)
We now have the ingredients ready for proving that the predicates of STRING under f  g have a fixed
point. This follows generically from, for instance, category theory. We omit proofs for these familiar
and easily verified conclusions.
Round Trip Lemma [4.3]: STRING |- φ  φ** (provided AR and STRING are both 
consistent and complete, and AR is strictly axiomatisable).
The cyclical image φ** of φ in STRING must be if not equal then at least equivalent to φ.
Section 5 – The reconstructed Theorem.
Definition 5.1: The predicate TRUE is a truth predicate for a theory STRINGT meta to T,
if for all sentences φ, STRINGT |- TRUE(g(φ))  φ
where g is a modelling transformation from STRING into T.
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What follows is a reconstruction or restatement of Gödel’s Theorem within the framework we have
developed so far. Though evidently not identical, it aims to stay as close as possible to the spirit of the
original.
Gödel’s Theorem (according to Gödel) [5.2]: If both  AR and  STRING are consistent and
complete, and AR strictly axiomatisable, then STRING contains a truth predicate.
Proof: We show that PROV is a truth predicate.
STRING |- PROV(g(φ))  STRING |- φ.
As PROV expresses provability for AR, STRING |- PROV(g(φ)) implies AR
|- g(φ).
By embedding, AR |- g(φ) implies STRING |- f(g(φ)) = φ*.
Hence STRING |- φ (Round tripping).
STRING |- PROV(g(φ))  STRING |- φ
STRING |- φ implies AR |- g(φ).
As PROV expresses provability for AR, STRING |- PROV(g(φ))
Predictably next,
Tarski’s Theorem [5.3]: No consistent and complete theory can contain a truth predicate.
Proof: By applying to itself the predicate Fssb(P) ≡ TRUE(g(sub(P,g(P))), (F for false, ssb
for self-substitution).
Gödel’s cleverly self-referential sentence can be recovered as g(Fssb(Fssb)), the image in  AR of the
sentence Fssb(Fssb) that would break STRING.
Corollary 5.4: Either that
      STRING exists, and is consistent and complete
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           or that
      AR is consistent, complete, and strictly axiomatisable
           is false.
Proof: Taken together the two would prove the existence of a consistent and complete theory, 
STRING, with a truth predicate, contradicting Tarski’s Theorem.
At first sight there appears to be an honest choice. The question seems to be on which of the initial
assumptions should we pin the blame for a contradiction that emerges at the end of a long derivation.
The theory  STRING is a  prima facie  favourite for carrying the blame – it  is an odd, untested and
hugely ambitious theory. This conclusion becomes inevitable once we note that essentially the same
argument can be made without involving arithmetic at all, simply by taking a second copy of STRING
in place of  AR.  (It  goes without saying that the argument can  not be made with two copies of an
arithmetic theory.)
Gödel’s  Theorem (2nd approximation)  [5.5]:  STRINGSTRING,  if  consistent,  complete,  and
strictly axiomatisable, contains a truth predicate.
Proof:  Let  STRINGSTRING,  a simple  variation of  STRINGAR,  be a theory meta to a generic
concatenation-based theory over a sufficiently large finite alphabet.
Take two copies of STRINGSTRING, labelled STRING1 and STRING2. Each theory is, without
any circularity, meta to the other. 
If  STRING1 is  axiomatisable,  then  by  the  same  argument  we  used  for  AR a  provability
predicate PROV that applies to the underlying theory – STRING2 is this case – can be defined.
One  way  still  takes  the  Embedding  Lemma,  the  way  back  is  much  easier  this  time:  the
identical mapping. Round Trip then holds true, so the Theorem follows.
Although  the  investigation  is  not  finished  yet,  there  is  one  thing  that  we  can  already  say  with
confidence:  everything  of  importance  in  Gödel’s  argument  happens  on  the  preimage  side.  String
theories are first in line to suffer incompleteness results. Only after they fall would these results also
24
transfer to other kinds of theories. As the 2nd Approximation once again demonstrates, there can be
Gödel-style incompleteness arguments without number theory, and any of its subtheories. But there can
be no incompleteness arguments without CONCAT-based meta theories. At least on the preimage side,
extensional  string theories must always occur.  From here on, as a consequence, arithmetic will  be
largely irrelevant to the investigation.
STRINGSTRING is in no way special. Any variation of STRING for different underlying theories consists
of  a  version  of  CONCAT and  varying  definitions  of  meta  predicates.  The  differing  versions  of
CONCAT are contained in each other by a simple permutation of the alphabet; the meta predicates for
one  formal  theory  are  definable  by  the  same  means  as  the  predicates  for  any  other.  If  we  can
successfully define a string theory meta to one axiomatisable theory, then we should be able to define a
string theory meta to  any other  axiomatisable theory.  Without loss of  generality,  we  can therefore
continue to speak of STRING without a subscript.
Corollary 5.6: STRING, if it  exists at all, and is consistent, cannot be both complete and
strictly axiomatisable.
Proof: By Tarski’s Theorem, from the 2nd Approximation.
This is not quite the same as the trilemma that Gödel thought applied to number theory: From the three
desirable qualities of consistency, completeness, and axiomatisability, pick any two. There is a forth
option, that CONCAT, which was used to build STRING, does not exist. The contradiction that carries
the proof is the same. But as a payoff for the cleanly syntactic presentation we have worked to achieve,
we have an additional assumption for it to refute.
Corollary 5.7: If  CONCAT exists,  then there exists a  theory,  STRING,  that  is  essentially
incomplete.
Proof: Since the extension that expands CONCAT into STRING is strictly axiomatisable, the
axiomatisability of STRING depends solely on the axiomatisability of CONCAT.
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Except for the ‘if  CONCAT exists’ condition, this finding of an essentially incomplete theory is the
same as in traditional presentations. We could have reached an identical result by running the argument
to this point with STRING on the image side, instead of AR.5
Section 6 – Consequences
We are now in possession of a contradiction that refutes the conjunction of three assumptions, and we
know what it would mean to deploy the contradiction to refute completeness / axiomatisability. What
would  it  mean  to  deploy  the  contradiction  to  refute  the  new  assumption  on  the  board,  Gödel’s
Assumption,  the  assumption  of  the  right  to  use  extensional  concatenation  in  Gödel-style  meta
arguments,  an assumption we have operationalised as  the existence of  CONCAT ?  It  would mean
rejecting  the  existence  of  a  theory  that  successfully  envelopes  all  the  theories  CONCATn.
Approximating theories exist, but there would be, as it were, no limit to infinity.
In the end, there is a choice, though not an equal one. The situation is that there are two conflicting
assumptions,  neither  of  which appears  to  be provable  outright.  We have tried  and failed  to  prove
Gödel’s Assumption from weaker or less problematic assumptions. On the opposite side we find the
assumption of completeness for theories equipollent to number theory, e.g. number theory itself and
comparably strong concatenation theories.  Because for as  long as  we are also unable to prove the
assumption  of  completeness  –  and  it  would  be  unrealistic  to  expect  that  to  change  –  no  hard
contradiction  will  emerge.  While  the  choice  stands  open,  the  completeness  assumption,  innocent
though it may be, remains vulnerable to blame shifting.
5 This is a matter of some delicacy as it is known that adaptations of a Gödel-style incompleteness argument are available already
for quite weak theories of implicit concatenation, e.g. Grzegorczyk [2005].
The  point  to  note  is  that  even  though,  confusingly,  they  bear  the  promising  label  ‘concatenation’,  implicit  theories  of
concatenation still have to be interpreted as extensional concatenation for any meta arguments to get underway. In this they are
no different from number theory or Q, non-extensional theories that were interpreted as extensional concatenation for the sake of
incompleteness  arguments running in  parallel.  The results  for  implicit  concatenation theories  could be restated as  we have
restated the result for arithmetic, and would then also come back with an additional assumption about CONCAT.
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Let’s look first at the choice that makes less sense. Assuming a great deal of motivation it would remain
just possible to continue insisting on the existence of CONCAT.
However,  at  this late  stage it  would effectively turn Gödel’s Assumption into a  postulate,  Gödel’s
Axiom. The Axiom would assert the Assumption; or more generally, formalise assumptions that certain
string predicate expressions successfully extensionalise into sets of strings. Through an axiom of this
sort, simply by taking descriptive expressions at face value, one could force into existence an infinitary
string object, a theory in the extensional sense of a set of formal sentences.
The infinitary string object thus created would be custom-made to be unformalisable. A flat set of
sentences,  unaxiomatised  and  essentially  unaxiomatisable.  With  the  set  pretending  to  contain  the
otherwise  unreachable “truth”  about  extensional  concatenation,  we  would  be  provably  unable  to
summarise it by finite axioms, or a finite number of regular schemes.
Although possible, we should be clear about what taking this course of action would mean. Because of
mutual representability by Gödel numberings and similar techniques it would mean that undecidability
comes  roaring  back  for  a  wide  range  of  theories.  Once  (re)introduced  as  CONCAT,  it  would
immediately spread to other theories, including some as weak as Q.
In  the  final  analysis,  to  adopt  Gödel’s  Assumption  as  an  axiom would mean postulating essential
incompleteness, and all the weirdness it entails, because one considers it to be a desirable state of the
world.
Be that as it may, we stand at a fork, with two paths ahead. One is known to exhaustion, the other
temptingly unexplored. For what remains of the paper, we will be taking the more interesting route, by
treating the soft contradiction as a hard , and then choosing to consider Gödel’s Assumption refuted.
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Gödel’s Theorem (3rd approximation) [6.1]: Extensional concatenation is not formalisable in
first-order logic: For any theory T with strings over  for constants, there exists an n and an
atomic sentence c(s,t) = u that is decided by T in a different way than it is by CONCATn.
Proof: This is only a statement of the negation of Gödel’s Assumption aka ‘CONCAT exists’.
Recall that, as a working assumption, CONCAT was defined to be a first-order theory. An obvious line
of inquiry would be to ask whether higher orders of the predicate calculus, or other logics, would make
any difference. It appears not. Readers are invited to verify that moving up to the second order does not
materially change the outcome. The most promising route to an axiomatisation, the trick of quantifying
inside terms, violates  the standards of  any conventional logic,  second order  as  much as  first.  The
presumption becomes that no consistent formalisation exists, in any conceivable type of formalism.6
To refute the Assumption is to conclude that there is no formalism that can contain concatenation, that
decides all c-sentences the expected way. No formalism that can meet the low standard set by the
definition of CONCAT for deserving to be called ‘extensional concatenation’.
The new path begins by admitting that there is no infinite c-function, native string relations never were
total,  there is  nothing equivalent  on the side of  the preimage for  arithmetic  relations to  represent.
Interpretation fails for all non-finite relations.
The new path continues to understanding that the absence of total string functions is not caused by
theories failing to live up to some independent truth. It is caused by the fact that there is nothing to
these  notions of  truth,  nothing to  formalise in  the first  place.  Fragmented formalisations perfectly
express that string reality itself is fragmented.
6 The only formalisms that do appear to be able to capture extensional concatenation are non-standard and inconsistent (see
footnote 2). This supports the conclusion that the idea of the function ranging infinitely wide, transcending all perimeters, is
incoherent.
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Although unformalisability will disappear, strange occurrences do not. Extensional string predicates
will continue to provoke phenomena that can look superficially similar to the traditional weirdness
created by essential incompleteness.
There are fragments that do not assemble into a whole. Fragmented predicates Pn, based on CONCATn,
are admitted to exist, but these fragments do not assemble into total predicates P. Finite combinations
of Pn and Qm are possible, but, in general, no countably infinite unions. 
Definition [6.2]: For any P(x) from C, let Pn(x) be the expression that restricts P(x) to Σn, i.e.
strings over Σ of length ≤ n.
There are approximating sequences that converge over initial ranges, up to the edge of their perimeter,
but fail to reach infinity. Specifically, there are diagonal predicates D where for finite N < M we can
prove:
CONCAT1 |- x D1(x)
CONCAT2 |- x D2(x)
CONCAT3 |- x D3(x)
...
CONCATN |- x DN(x)
but we still cannot prove x D(x). No CONCATn can prove it for an unrestricted domain; nor would
implicit theories of concatenation, where D(x) also forms part of the language. On the contrary, the
expectation is that a plausible, sufficiently powerful theory of implicit concatenation would reject     x
D(x).
The inference
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“i CONCATi |- x Di(x)  x D(x)”
is intuitively compelling, but false.  Not so much because it  is  wrong  – after all,  all  strings would
eventually get covered by the enumeration –, but because without CONCAT we cannot even state it.
With perimeters properly applied, all we can state is for arbitrarily large M
i<M CONCATi |- x Di(x)  x D(x),
which is not compelling at all. 
One might paraphrase Gödel’s assumption as the ability to quantify over perimeters, so that one can
coherently speak of “ M”, or “i CONCATi”. This is equivalent to being allowed to enter another line
into the enumeration above, after CONCATN |- x DN(x), reading ‘...’
While there still is weirdness, the important point is that it is localised. Unlike the traditional symptoms
these strange tics are not infectious, they affect only extensional concatenation, and not any unrelated
concepts, or theories. Number theory, in particular, is going to be totally immune.
We can enjoy a much  more orderly world in which all  well-defined problems are expected to  be
decidable, and belief in the existence of unformalisable mathematical truth is considered quaint.
Gödel’s Theorem (final) [6.3]: Extensional concatenation is not a well-defined function.
In many ways, this conclusion is less a theorem than an exercise in boundary policing, an argument for
which functions should be accepted as existing. By showing how bizarre the consequences of admitting
extensional concatenation would be it urges to conclude that the idea has no merit. The better choice of
Gödel’s Axiom is to postulate not Gödel’s Assumption, but its negation.
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Gödel’s incompleteness argument, though endlessly revealing about string theories, tells us very little
about number theory. The original incompleteness result, the root cause of all the others, is the result
for CONCAT. The contradiction that, when the existence of CONCAT is assumed, can be used to refute
the completeness of number theory, and many other theories, is frankly imported from the preimage
side.  Incompleteness  results  are  without  exception  the  effect  of  projecting  onto  other  theories  the
strange properties and failings of a hypothetically assumed CONCAT.
When we do conclude that  CONCAT does not exist, the projections will instantly stop, and number
theory, as well as all other theories able to model string predicates, will no longer be affected by any
kind  of  unformalisability.  (This  includes  also  implicit  theories  of  concatenation.)  Once  we  reject
Gödel’s Assumption, no reason remains for believing in Gödel’s original conclusion. Although absence
of counterevidence does not constitute evidence, it  is only natural to revert to completeness as the
default assumption.
The  lesson  of  Gödel’s  Theorem:  Concatenation,  used  naïvely,  can  be  just  as  treacherous  as  the
membership relation  .  So in a way Gödel’s argument does for concatenation-based theories what
Russell’s paradox does for set theory: For both types of theories, the naïve assumption that all predicate
expressions ought to be able to have an extension turns out to be untenable despite its overwhelming
intuitive appeal.
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